Deconstructing the Clean Air Act: Examining the Controversy Surrounding Massachusetts’ Adoption of the California Low Emission Vehicle Program by Ridge, John Hiski
Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review
Volume 22 | Issue 1 Article 7
9-1-1994
Deconstructing the Clean Air Act: Examining the
Controversy Surrounding Massachusetts’
Adoption of the California Low Emission Vehicle
Program
John Hiski Ridge
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr
Part of the Air and Space Law Commons, and the Environmental Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College
Law School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
John Hiski Ridge, Deconstructing the Clean Air Act: Examining the Controversy Surrounding
Massachusetts’ Adoption of the California Low Emission Vehicle Program, 22 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 163
(1994), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr/vol22/iss1/7
DE CONSTRUCTING THE CLEAN AIR ACT: 
EXAMINING THE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING 
MASSACHUSETTS'S ADOPTION OF THE CALIFORNIA 
LOW EMISSION VEHICLE PROGRAM 
John Hiski Ridge* 
If my fellow citizens want to go to Hell I will help them. It's my job.1 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In response to the growing pollution problem in Massachusetts, the 
legislature of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts enacted M.G.L. c. 
111, § 142k.2 This law instructed the Department of Environmental 
Protection (DEP) to adopt a motor vehicle emissions standards and 
compliance program based on California's motor vehicle emissions 
standards and compliance program.3 The DEP was required to adopt 
the California program unless it determined that California's program 
would not achieve greater motor vehicle pollution reductions than the 
* Business Editor, 1994-1995, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVlRONMENTAL AFFAlRS LAW REVIEW. 
11 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 249 (M. Howe ed. 1953), cited in Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting 
Statutes In The Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 407 (1989) (discussing methods of 
statutory interpretation). 
2 MASs. GEN. L. ch. 111, § 142k (1990) (adoption of California's motor vehicle emission stand-
ards; sale of non-certified vehicles prohibited; exemptions; department regulations; manufac-
turer warranties; penalties); see Defendant Daniel S. Greenbaum's Memorandum in Opposition 
to Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 12, American Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n v. 
Greenbaum, No. 93-10799-MA, 1993 WL 443946 (D. Mass. Oct. 27,1993), aff'd sub nom. Ameri-
can Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n v. Commissioner, Mass. Dep't of Envtl. Protection, F.3d_, No. 
93-2276, 1994 WL 393115 (1st Cir. Aug. 3, 1994) [hereinafter Defendant's Memorandum]. 
3 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 111, § 142k (1990); see American Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n v. Greenbaum, 
No. 93-10799-MA, 1993 WL 443946, at *1 (D. Mass. Oct. 27,1993) [hereinafter AAMA I), aff'd 
sub nom. American Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n v. Commissioner, Mass. Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 
F.3d_, No. 93-2276, 1994 WL 393115 (1st Cir. Aug. 3, 1994) [hereinafter AAMA ll). 
163 
164 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 22:163 
federal standards and compliance program set forth in the Clean Air 
Act.4 
On January 31, 1992, having determined that the California pro-
gram would achieve greater reductions than the federal standards, 
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts adopted the California emission 
standards and compliance program.5 The DEP, however, did not adopt 
the entire California program.6 The DEP adopted only the "Low 
Emission Vehicle" (LEV) portion of the program, opting to exclude 
the "Clean Fuel" (CF) portion.7 
Shortly thereafter, the DEP found itself the defendant in a lawsuit.8 
The plaintiffs, the American Automobile Manufacturers Association, 
the Association of International Automobile Manufacturers, Inc., and 
the Massachusetts State Automobile Dealers Association, Inc. (collec-
tively called the auto-manufacturers), challenged the DEP's adoption 
of the LEV program.9 
This Comment discusses this controversy between the auto-manu-
facturers and the DEP. Section II explicates the history and back-
ground which has led up to this controversy. Section IIA discusses 
the role of the federal and state governments in regulating air pollu-
tion. Section liB examines the Clean Air Act, particularly focusing on 
the policy and intent behind the construction of the Act. Section IIC 
analyzes California's tailpipe emission-control program, and section 
liD discusses Massachusetts's adoption of the California LEV pro-
gram. 
In order to resolve this controversy, the courts must interpret the 
Clean Air Act. Section III develops a hermeneutical method by which 
4 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 111, § 142k (1990). See generally The Honorable Henry A. Waxman et aI., 
Cars, Fuels, and Clean Air: A Review of Title II of the Clean Air Act Amendments Of 1990, 
21 ENVTL. L. 1947 (1991) (explaining the federal standards and compliance program as set forth 
in Title II of the Clean Air Act). 
5 See Air Pollution Control Regulations, MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 310, § 7.40 (1992); see also 
Complaint at 15, American Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n v. Greenbaum, No. 93-10799-MA, 1993 WL 
443946 (D.Mass. Oct. 27, 1993), aff'd sub nom. American Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n v. Commis-
sioner, Mass. Dep't of Envtl. Protection, F.3d_, No. 93-2276, 1994 WL 393115 (lst Cir. Aug. 3, 
1994) [hereinafter Complaint); AAMA I, supra note 3, at *1. 
6 See Air Pollution Control Regulations, MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 310, § 7.40 (1992); see also 
Complaint, supra note 5, at 15; AAMA I, supra note 3, at *1. 
7 See Memorandum from Department of Environmental Protection Relating DEP's Response 
To Comments Received During Public Hearing For 310 C.M.R. 7.40; Entitled Response To 
Comments, 310 C.M.R. 7.40, Massachusetts Low Emission Vehicles Standard 5-6 (Jan. 31, 1992); 
see also Complaint, supra note 5, at 15; AAMA I, supra note 3, at *1; Defendant's Memorandum, 
supra note 2, at 13. 
8 See generally AAMA I, supra note 3, at *1; Complaint, supra note 5, at 1. 
9 See, e.g., AAMA I, supra note 3, at *1; Complaint, supra note 5, at 1--5. 
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to do so. Following this discussion, section IV examines in detail the 
legal issues which have arisen in this controversy. This discussion 
focuses on the hermeneutic schemes utilized by the parties. Both the 
auto-manufacturers and the DEP seek to interpret the Clean Air Act 
to their own advantage. This section argues that both parties' herme-
neutical methods were improper. Finally, each legal issue is analyzed 
following the appropriate hermeneutical scheme. 
II. UNPACKING THE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING 
MASSACHUSETTS'S ADOPTION OF THE CALIFORNIA Low EMISSION 
VEHICLE PROGRAM 
A. Federal Preemption and State Freedom to Regulate Air 
Pollution 
The Constitution of the United States asserts that "[t]his Consti-
tution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land."l0 Ac-
cordingly, the Congress of the United States may preempt the entire 
field of air pollution regulation.ll As of yet, however, Congress has 
made no attempt to do SO.12 Air pollution regulation has been, and 
continues to be, controlled by both the states and the federal govern-
ment in what has been termed a "cooperative federalism."13 In areas 
10 u.s. CONST. art. VI, § 2; see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. New York State Dep't 
of Envtl. Conservation, 810 F. Supp. 1331, 1336 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) [hereinafter MVMA J], judg-
ment vacated in part, dec. modified in part on recan., 831 F.Supp. 57, (N.D.N.Y. 1993) [herein-
after MVMA IIJ, judgment all'd in part, rev'd in part, 17 F.3d 521 (2d Cir. 1994) [hereinafter 
MVMAIIl]. 
11 See MVMA I, supra note 10, at 1336. 
12 See 42 U.S.C. § 7407 (1988) (stating that each state shall have the primary responsibility 
for assuring air quality within the entire geographic area comprising such state by submitting 
an implementation plan which specifies the manner in which national primary and secondary 
ambient air quality standards will be achieved and maintained); see also Defendant's Memoran-
dum, supra note 2, at 5. 
13 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1988) (discussing the national primary and secondary ambient 
air quality standards as set by the federal government) with 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1988) (discussing 
the states' role in adopting plans which provide for the implementation, maintenance, and 
enforcement of the national primary and secondary ambient air quality standards). See ZYGMUNT 
J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW AND SOCIETY 776 
(1992) (This text uses and defines the term "cooperative federalism." Under the plan of coop-
erative federalism, the states are charged with developing a State Implementation Plan setting 
forth the pollution control strategies it will use to bring its air quality into compliance with the 
NAAQS and to maintain such compliance thereafter. The text then states that the federal 
government's role would be threefold. First, it would set the standards that must be met. 
Second, it would review SIPs to insure that plans would result in the attainment of the 
mandated degree of air quality. Third, it would supplant the states as primary regulators if the 
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the federal government has not preempted, the states have been 
given the freedom to regulate air pollution in any necessary and 
sufficient manner.14 
B. The Clean Air Act 
1. Mobile Source Pollution Contribution 
Mobile sources of air pollution have long been recognized as major 
contributors to health problems in the United States.15 Currently, 
mobile sources are the single most important cause of ozone pollution 
in the United States.16 Ozone, the main ingredient in urban smog, is 
created when hydrocarbons (HCs) and other volatile organic com-
pounds (VOCs) react with nitrogen oxides (NOx) in the presence of 
sunlightP Mobile sources contribute approximately fifty percent of 
the nation's HC and VOC emissions and only a slightly smaller per-
cent of the nation's NOx emissions.18 Ozone pollution and urban smog 
states failed to act, or acted in a way that would not insure attainment.); Theodore L. Garrett 
and Sonya D. Winner, A Clean Air Act Primer: Part I, 22 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 
10,159, 10,161 (1992) [hereinafter A Clean Air Act Primer: Part l] (stating that Congress 
envisioned a new kind of federal and state partnership in which the EPA established national 
air quality standards, but the primary role of the states was preserved by allowing the states 
to adopt measures to attain the air quality standards). 
14 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (1988) (the Environmental Protection Agency was directed by 
Congress to implement federal standards regarding the emission of various pollutants) with 42 
U.S.C. § 7410 (1988) (each state has the freedom to design its State Implementation Plan as it 
chooses). See A Clean Air Act Primer: Part I, supra note 13, at 10,163 (stating that the Clean 
Air Act gives each state the freedom to design its implementation plan as it chooses so as to be 
consistent with the state's political, economic, and social policy concerns). 
15 See Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 63 (1975) ("In 1960, Congress 
directed the Surgeon General to focus his attention on the health hazards resulting from motor 
vehicle emissions."); see also David Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes Or Rules Statutes: The Case of 
the Clean Air Act, 30 UCLA L. REV. 740, 756 (1983) (stating that the 1970 Clean Air Act 
purported to protect public health and welfare); PLATER ET AL., supra note 13, at 773 ("The 
standards are called 'harm-based' here because the mandated quality levels are set by reference 
to ambient levels of pollutants that would result in harm to human health and the environ-
ment."). 
16 See Waxman et al., supra note 4, at 1950 ("[M]obile sources are the single most important 
cause of ozone pollution, the nation's most wide-spread air pollutant."); see also Defendant's 
Memorandum, supra note 2, at 6. 
17Waxman et al., supra note 4, at 1950; see MVMA I, supra note 10, at 1337; Letter from 
Barbara Kwetz, Director DAQC, to Daniel S. Greenbaum, Commissioner, Department of Envi-
ronmental Protection (Jan. 14, 1992) (on file with author) [hereinafter Letter from Barbara 
Kwetz]. 
18 Waxman et al., supra note 4, at 1950 (quoting Walsh, Global Trends In Motor Vehicle Use 
And Emissions, 15 ANN. REV. ENERGY 217, 218 (1990»; see The Honorable Henry A. Waxman, 
An Overview of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 21 ENVTL. L. 1721, 1768 (1991) 
[hereinafter Waxman II]; cf Letter from Barbara K wetz, supra note 17. 
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are particularly harmful to humans. They are respiratory irritants 
that cause among other things "chest pains, shortness of breath, 
coughing, nausea, throat irritation, and increased susceptibility to 
respiratory infections."19 The young, elderly, and those who suffer 
from bronchitis, emphysema, and asthma are particularly susceptible 
to these afflictions.20 
Mobile sources are also the single largest contributor of carbon 
monoxide (CO) pollution,21 contributing seventy percent of the carbon 
monoxide pollution nationwide and approximately ninety percent in 
urban areasP Carbon monoxide presents a major health risk to indi-
viduals because it prevents the transfer of oxygen to the blood stream, 
thereby depriving the brain of oxygen.23 
Mobile sources are also the nation's largest contributor of toxic 
emissions.24 These cancer causing emissions include diesel particu-
lates, butadiene, benzene, and formaldehyde.25 Lastly, mobile source 
air pollution contributes both to the acid rain problem currently af-
flicting certain areas of the United States, and to the problems of 
ozone depletion and global warming.26 Acid rain, ozone depletion, and 
global warming all have their own attendant health risks. 
In the Northeast, mobile sources emit an even higher percentage ofVOCs and NOx. 61% of 
VOCs and 53% of NOx come from motor vehicles. See Clean Air Act Amendments (Part 1): 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy 
and Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 335 (1990) (testimony of the Northeast States for Coor-
dinated Air Use Management), cited in Waxman et al., supra note 4, at 1950-51 n.7. 
19 COMMITrEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, REPORT OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS 
OF 1990, H.R. REP. No. 490, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 199-200 (1990), cited in Waxman et 
al., supra note 4, at 1950 n.5; see Letter from Barbara Kwetz, supra note 17. 
20 Compare Letter from Barbara Kwetz, supra note 17 (stating that ozone exacerbates such 
medical problems as bronchitis, emphysema, and asthma) with Report from the Department of 
Environmental Protection, Division of Air Quality Control, The Massachusetts Low Emission 
Vehicle (LEV) Program (Sept. 1993) (on file with author) (stating that the young, the old, people 
with heart conditions, and pregnant women are most at risk as a result of smog). 
21 See Waxman et al., supra note 4, at 1951 (quoting Walsh, supra note 18, at 218). 
22ld. 
23 See MVMA I, supra note 10, at 1337; see also COMMITrEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 
REPORT OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990, H.R. REP. No. 490, 101st Cong., 2d 
Sess., pt. 1, at 205-06 (1990), cited in Waxman et al., supra note 4, at 1951 n.1O. 
24 Waxman et al., supra note 4, at 1951. 
25 COMMITrEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, REPORT OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS 
OF 1990, H.R. REP. No. 490, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 277-79 (1990), cited in Waxman et 
al., supra note 4, at 1951 n.ll. 
26 Waxman et al., supra note 4, at 1951 and n.8 (citing Health and Environ. Subcomm. of the 
House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Causes and Impacts of Acid Rain (Feb. 2, 1990), 
reprinted in 136 CONGo REC. H2537 (1990) (speaking solely on the issue of acid rain». 
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2. A History of the Clean Air Act: A Commitment to Public Health 
In response to the growing problem of air pollution and its atten-
dant health risks, Congress first enacted the Air Pollution Act (APA) 
of 1955.27 The APA directed the Surgeon General to investigate the 
air pollution problem and to provide assistance to the states in their 
attempt to abate it.2B In 1960, the Surgeon General was once again 
required to investigate the air pollution problem.29 This time, how-
ever, Congress explicitly stated that the health problems resulting 
from air pollution were to be a primary focus.30 Continuing the grow-
ing trend of federal control of air quality, in 1963, Congress once again 
expanded the role of the federal government. The Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) was directed to identify pol-
lutants that cause adverse health effects and to establish air quality 
criteria in relation to those pollutants.31 State compliance with the air 
quality standards, however, was not made mandatory.32 Then, in 1967, 
in response to growing recognition of the significant contribution that 
mobile sources make to air pollution, Congress further broadened 
federal control.33 Preempting state authority, Congress directed the 
HEW to develop federal emission standards for motor vehicles.34 One 
27 Air Pollution Control-Research and Technical Assistance Act of 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-159, 
69 Stat. 322 (1955); see A Clean Air Act Primer: Part I, supra note 13, at 10,161 ("The first 
federal initiative, the Air Pollution Control Act of 1955, focused on research and on financial and 
technical support for state programs."); MVMA III, supra note 10, at 524 ("The original Clean 
Air Act, enacted by Congress in 1955, was aimed primarily at increasing federal research and 
assistance in air pollution prevention."); cf. PLATER ET AL., supra note 13, at 760 ("In 1955, 
Congress passed a five-year Air Pollution Act that had no practicable regulatory provisions."). 
28 Air Pollution Control-Research and Technical Assistance Act of 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-159, 
69 Stat. 322 (1955); see Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 63 (1975). 
29 Motor Vehicle Exhaust Study Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-493, 74 Stat. 162 (1960); see Train, 
421 U.S. at 63; PLATER ET AL., supra note 13, at 760. 
30 Motor Vehicle Exhaust Study Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-493, 74 Stat. 162 (1960); see Train, 
421 U.S. at 63 ("In 1960, Congress directed the Surgeon General to focus his attention on the 
health hazards resulting from motor vehicle emissions."). 
31 The Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963); see A Clean Air Act 
Primer: Part I, supra note 13, at 10,161 (stating that the 1963 Act expanded the role of the 
federal government, and that the HEW was authorized to establish air quality criteria); Ed-
mund S. Muskie, The Clean Air Act: A Commitment To Public Health, THE ENVTL. F. 13, 14 
(Jan./Feb. 1990) (stating that in the 1963 Act, Congress directed the development of air quality 
criteria to identify pollutant levels that cause adverse health effects). 
32 See The Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963), cited in A Clean Air 
Act Primer: Part I, supra note 13, at 10,161. 
33 See The Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148,81 Stat. 485 (1967), cited in A Clean 
Air Act Primer: Part I, supra note 13, at 10,161; see also Train, 421 U.S. at 64; MVMA III, 
supra note 10, at 525. 
34 See The Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (1967); see also MVMA 
III, supra note 10, at 525 (stating that the 1967 Act imposed federal preemption over motor 
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exception, however, was made with regard to state preemption. Cali-
fornia, which had tougher emission standards than the federal stand-
ards, maintained its sovereignty.35 
By 1970, it was clear that the previous efforts to control air pollu-
tion and improve air quality were inadequate.36 Senator Muskie, the 
chief author of the 1970 Clean Air Act and the purported champion 
of the new environmental movement, stated that "air pollution con-
tinued to threaten public health."37 There was "little doubt ... that 
the country was facing an air pollution crisis."38 Hence, Congress got 
down to business and developed the 1970 Clean Air Act,39 with the 
chief goal being that "all Americans in all parts of the country ... have 
clean air to breath."40 Protection of public health was the legally 
defensible premise upon which the 1970 Act was constructed.41 
vehicle emission standards); A Clean Air Act Primer: Part I, supra note 13, at 10,161; Muskie, 
supra note 31, at 14; PLATER ET AL., supra note 13, at 760-61. 
35 See The Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (1967); see also MVMA 
III, supra note 10, at 525 (stating that California was exempted from the preemption over the 
adamant objections of the automobile industry which sought a single national standard); Muskie, 
supra note 31, at 14 (suggesting that the California exemption was given because California had 
tougher emission standards than the federal standards, and because the size of the California 
automobile market would prevent the exemption from becoming too much of a hardship on the 
auto-manufacturers); PLATER ET AL., supra note 13, at 7604i1. 
36 See A Clean Air Act Primer: Part I, supra note 13, at 10,161 (stating that the federal air 
quality program was considered flawed because the statute did not clearly define its goals, there 
were no federal air pollution standards, and the statute did not provide for effective federal 
enforcement); Train, 421 U.S. at 64 (stating that the response of the states was disappointing); 
Muskie, supra note 31, at 14 (stating that despite the 1967 Act, air pollution continued to 
threaten public health); PLATER ET AL., supra note 13, at 761 (stating that the 1967 Act, along 
with the previous Acts, did little to remedy the problem of auto air pollution). 
37 Muskie, supra note 31, at 14. Technically, the 1970 Amendments are just that, amendments. 
However, the amendments were so pervasive that most people, when referring to the Clean 
Air Act, are referring to the 1970 Act. Hence, the 1970 Act is now commonly referred to as the 
Clean Air Act. See PLATER ET AL., supra note 13, at 773 n.3. 
38 116 CONGo REC. 42,381--82 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Muskie), cited in Schoenbrod, supra note 
15, at 744. 
39 The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970). 
40 See 116. CONGo REC. 42,381 (1970) (comments made by Senator Muskie), cited in Schoen-
brod, supra note 15, at 746. 
41 See Muskie, supra note 31, at 14-15. 
I was convinced that strict federal air pollution regulation would require a legally 
defensible premise. Protection of public health seemed the strongest and most appro-
priate such premise .... The decisions on which pollutants to regulate and at what level 
they were to be regulated are based on health and welfare criteria .... The division 
between primary and secondary standards also reflects the emphasis on health-related 
issues. 
Id.; see also Schoenbrod, supra note 15, at 746 (stating that the 1970 Act seemed to avoid 
compromise by stating an absolute duty to achieve a set of goals-the protection of health, 
welfare, and natural air quality); Train V. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 65 
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Through the 1970 Act, Congress expanded the cooperative feder-
alism developed under the previous clean air legislation.42 The Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) was directed to develop national 
ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for pollutants which "cause 
or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to 
endanger public health or welfare."43 Public health and welfare were 
the established basis for deciding which pollutants to regulate and the 
extent of the regulations.44 Congress, however, did preserve the pri-
mary role of the states. Under the Act, each state was given "the 
primary responsibility for assuring air quality within the entire geo-
graphic area comprising such state."45 The states may adopt any meas-
ure necessary to ensure compliance with the federally mandated air 
quality standards.46 Compliance, though, was no longer optionalP The 
Act required states to submit to the EPA implementation plans de-
signed to show how the state intended to attain and maintain the air 
quality standards.48 
Realizing that current technology was inadequate to prevent fur-
ther air quality degradation, Congress, in addition to expanding the 
cooperative federalism, sought to stimulate new technology.49 New 
(1975) (stating that the primary standards were to protect public health and the secondary 
standards were to protect public welfare). 
42 Compare 42 u.s.c. § 7409 (1988) (discussing the national primary and secondary ambient 
air quality standards as set by the federal government) with 42 u.s.c. § 7410 (1988) (discussing 
the states' role in adopting plans which provide for the implementation, maintenance, and 
enforcement of the national primary and secondary ambient air quality standards). See A Clean 
Air Act Primer: Part I, supra note 13, at 10,161 (stating that Congress envisioned a new kind 
of federal and state partnership, with the federal government gaining greater influence, but at 
the same time preserving the primary role of the states). 
43 42 U .S.C. § 7408 (1988); see MVMA I, supra note 10, at 1336. 
44 See Muskie, supra note 31, at 15; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (1988) (stating that the national 
primary ambient air quality standards are requisite to protect the public health, and the 
secondary ambient air quality standards are requisite to protect the public welfare from any 
known or anticipated adverse effects associated with the presence of such air pollutants in the 
ambient air). 
45 42 U.S.C. § 7407 (1988); see Train, 421 U.S. at 64. 
46 See 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1988); see also Train,421 U.S. at 65. 
47 See 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1988) (each state is required to submit a state implementation plan); 
see also Train,421 U.S. at 64...u5 (stating that the states were no longer given any choice as to 
whether they would meet the air quality requirements). 
48 See 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1988) (each state was required to submit a state implementation plan); 
see also MVMA I, supra note 10, at 1336 (stating that under the 1970 Act, Congress required 
the states to adopt and submit to the EPA a state implementation plan which provides for the 
implementation, maintenance and enforcement of the national ambient air quality standards); 
Muskie, supra note 31, at 15 (stating that § 110 of the 1970 Act required the states to submit 
SIPs). 
49 See Muskie, supra note 31, at 14 (Muskie states that "Senator Howard Baker believed that 
the American technological genius should be brought to bear on the air pollution problem, and 
that industry should be required to apply the best technology available."); A Clean Air Act 
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stationary sources of air pollution were required to meet the air 
quality standards using the best available technology (BAT).50 Also, 
the 1970 Act allowed the EPA to regulate mobile sources of pollutants 
by controlling both tailpipe emissions and fuel composition.51 
The seven years following the 1970 Clean Air Act saw many ad-
vances in the protection of air quality and health.52 New technologies 
were developed,53 various parts of the country saw air quality im-
provements, and deterioration of air quality in many urban areas was 
slowed.54 During those same seven years, however, the automobile 
industry, the oil industry, and various other business groups waged 
an all-out war against the 1970 Act.55 This opposition led directly to 
the 1977 amendments which weakened the 1970 Act.56 Compliance 
with the CO and HC standards was postponed,57 and the standards 
for NOx were also relaxed.58 
Although the 1977 amendments weakened the Clean Air Act, Con-
gress did not completely abandon its commitment to clean air and 
public health. The 1977 amendments also demanded that non-attain-
ment areas make reasonable further progress towards attainment;59 
non-attainment areas must make "annual incremental reductions in 
emissions of the applicable air pollutant . . . to provide for attain-
ment."60 
Further amendments in 1990 signaled a renewal of the federal 
commitment to clean air and public health.61 First, Congress estab-
Primer: Part I, supra note 13, at 10,161 (stating that the 1970 amendments sought to stimulate 
new technology). 
50 A Clean Air Act Primer: Part I, supra note 13, at 10,161 (stating that the 1970 amendments 
sought to stimulate new technology, and that new sources were required to meet the air quality 
standards based upon the best available technology). 
51 See generally id. (stating that Title II of the Act gave the EPA authority to control both 
tailpipe emissions and the composition of fuels). 
52 See Muskie, supra note 31, at 15 ("In the seven years that followed, a great deal of work 
was done in the clean air laboratory of the real world."). 
53 See id. 
54 See id. 
55 See id. at 15-16. 
56 See The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977); see also 
Muskie, supra note 31, at 15-16. 
57 See Waxman et aI., supra note 4, at 1950 n. 3 ("The 1977 Amendments extended the deadline 
for achieving the 90% reduction to 1980 in the case of hydrocarbons and to 1981 in the case of 
carbon monoxide."). 
58 See id. ("The statutory requirement for a 90% reduction in NOx emissions was eliminated 
in favor of a more lenient standard that required only a 75% reduction by 1981."). 
59 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 13, at 812 ("The signal content of the 1977 non-attainment 
areas legislation, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7501-7508, is the insistence that non-attainment areas make 
'reasonable further progress' toward attainment."). 
60 Id. at 812 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7501). 
61 See The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990). 
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lished a graduated listing of non-attainment areas with categories 
ranging from marginal to extreme.62 The closer to the extreme clas-
sification a state falls, the more time it is given to comply with the air 
quality standards.63 Second, Congress strengthened the enforcement 
provisions of the Clean Air Act.64 The EPA was given power to issue 
compliance violations up to $25,000 per day.65 Many criminal mis-
demeanors were upgraded to felonies, and the 1990 amendments es-
tablished "bounty hunter" awards for citizens providing information 
leading to civil or criminal penalties.66 
The 1990 amendments, however, made their greatest contribution 
to clean air and health in the area of mobile source pollution. Congress 
adopted numerous provisions to reduce mobile source pollution for 
two reasons: the first was the high percentage levels of air pollution 
contributed by mobile sources,67 and the second was the relative cost-
effectiveness of reducing mobile source pollution. Compared to reduc-
ing stationary source pollution, reducing mobile source pollution is 
much less expensive.68 
With regard to mobile source pollution, Congress tightened the 
tailpipe emission standards on all light-duty vehicles.69 Congress also 
required, under certain circumstances, control of emissions from gaso-
line evaporation, and the recapture of refueling emissions.70 Durability 
requirements for emissions controls on vehicles were doubled,71 and a 
62 See A Clean Air Act Primer: Part I, supra note 13, at 10,162. 
63 See id. at 10,185. For example, the categories and years granted for attainment of the ozone 
standard are as follows: 
Marginal 3 years 
Moderate 6 years 
Serious 9 years 
Severe 15-17 years 
Extreme 20 years 
64 See id. at 10,162. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
15% in 6 years 
15% in 6 years and 3% per year thereafter 
15% in 6 years and 3% per year thereafter 
15% in 6 years and 3% per year thereafter 
67 See Waxman et aI., supra note 4, at 1952-53. 
6g See id. (The EPA estimates that the cost of reducing VOC emissions from stationary sources 
is approximately $5,000 per ton of VOC removed, and in some cases exceeding $25,000 per ton 
removed. In contrast, the cost of installing controls to reduce gasoline evaporation from vehicles 
is $80 per ton removed; on-board vapor recovery systems reduce VOC emissions at the cost of 
$550 per ton removed.) 
69 See 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (Supp. IV 1992), cited in Waxman II, supra note 18, at 1769. 
70 See id. 
71 See 42 U.S.C. § 7541 (Supp. IV 1992), quoted in Waxman II, supra note 18, at 1770 (the 
standards were doubled from five year or fifty-thousand miles to ten year or one-hundred-thou-
sand miles). 
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program was developed to control toxic pollutants from motor vehi-
cles.72 Lastly, clean fuel requirements were added.73 
3. Clean Air Standards, SIPs, and EPA/State Testing for 
Compliance 
Under section 109 of the Clean Air Act, the EPA is required to 
develop and publish national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) 
for various pollutants.74 These standards are divided into primary 
and secondary standards.75 Primary standards are ambient air qual-
ity standards which are requisite for the protection of the "public 
health."76 Secondary standards specify a level of air quality which is 
requisite to protect the "public welfare" from any known or antici-
pated effects associated with the presence of such air pollutants.77 The 
various pollutants found in automotive emissions fall within these two 
categories of pollutants regulated by the NAAQS.78 
In addition to the NAAQS requirements, the EPA was also directed 
to develop tailpipe emission standards and "clean fuel" standards. The 
EPA developed emission standards for all light-duty vehicles, diesel 
heavy-duty vehicles, motorcycles, and other types of engines.79 No 
state may adopt and enforce other standards without obtaining a 
waiver from the EPA.so The EPA has also regulated motor vehicle 
fuelP In areas with serious non-attainment problems, the sale of a 
reformulated gasoline designed to reduce various pollutant levels is 
required.82 Other non-attainment areas may opt into the reformulated 
fuel program by application to the EPA.83 
72 See 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (Supp. IV 1992), quoted in Waxman II, supra note 18, at 1770. 
73 See Waxman II, supra note 18, at 1770. 
7442 U.S.C. § 7409 (1988). 
75 See id. 
76 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (1988). 
7742 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(2) (1988). 
78 See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment at 
5--8, American Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n v. Greenbaum, No. 93-10799-MA, 1993 WL 443946 
(D.Mass. Oct. 27, 1993), aff'd sub nom. American Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n v. Commissioner, Mass. 
Dep't of Envtl. Protection, F.3d_, No. 93-2276, 1994 WL 393115 (1st Cir. Aug. 3,1994) [hereinafter 
Plaintiff's. Memorandum]. 
79 See Theodore L. Garrett and Sonya D. Winner, A Clean Air Act Primer: Part II, 22 ENVTL. 
L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,235, 10,257-58 (1992). 
80 See id. 
8! See 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), cited in A Clean Air Act Primer: Part II, 
supra note 79, at 10,259. 
82 See 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (Supp. IV 1992), cited in A Clean Air Act Primer: Part II, supra note 
79, at 10,260-B1. 
&~ See 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (Supp. IV 1992), cited in A Clean Air Act Primer: Part II, supra note 
79, at 10,261. 
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Congress accorded the development of the various N AAQS and 
tailpipe emission/clean fuel standards to the EPA, but the states were 
given the primary responsibility for assuring the "implementation, 
maintenance, and enforcement" of those standards within their re-
spective borders.84 Each state is required to submit to the EPA a state 
implementation plan (SIP) which will set forth the strategies that the 
state will use to bring its air quality into compliance with the federal 
standards and maintain compliance in the future.85 The EPA then 
approves or disapproves the SIP in whole or in part.86 Upon EPA 
approval, the SIP becomes enforceable by both the federal and state 
governments.87 
As part of enforcing and ensuring compliance with the air quality 
and emission standards, both the EPA and the states are required to 
conduct various testing programs. With regard to mobile source pol-
lution, the EPA must conduct two tests: the certification test and the 
in-use test.88 Prior to the sale of a new vehicle or engine model, the 
EPA uses a process known as "certification" to test each new model 
for compliance with the tailpipe emission standards.89 The certification 
test examines a prototype of every new vehicle developed by the 
auto-manufacturers. If the prototype conforms to the standards, the 
EPA issues a certificate of compliance.90 Mter new vehicles have been 
sold to the public, the EPA obtains a sample of the vehicles and 
conducts additional tests called "in-use" tests.91 If, as a result ofin-use 
testing, the EPA determines that a vehicle does not conform to the 
emission standards, it can order a recall of the vehicle model at the 
manufacturer's expense.92 Both the certification test and the in-use 
test are conducted with specially manufactured fuel known as indo-
84 See MVMA I, supra note 10, at 1336; Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 2, at 4-5; 42 
U.S.C. § 7410 (1988). 
85 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1988); see MVMA I, supra note 10, at 1336; Defendant's Memorandum, 
supra note 2, at 5. 
86 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1988); see A Clean Air Act Primer: Part I, supra note 13, at 10,163. 
87 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1988); see A Clean Air Act Primer: Part I, supra note 13, at 10,163. 
8842 U.S.C. § 7525 (1988) (certification test); 42 U.S.C. § 7541 (1988) (in-use test), cited in 
MVMA III, supra note 10, at 526-27; see MVMA I, supra note 10, at 1337. 
89 See 42 U.S.C. § 7525 (1988), cited in MVMA III, supra note 10, at 527; see also MVMA I, 
supra note 10, at 1337. 
90 See 42 U.S.C. § 7525 (1988). 
91 42 U.S.C. § 7541 (1988), cited in MVMA III, supra note 10, at 527; see MVMA I, supra note 
10, at 1337. 
92 42 U.S.C. § 7541 (1988), cited in MVMA III, supra note 10, at 527; see MVMA I, supra note 
10, at 1337. 
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lene or certification fue1.93 Indolene fuel has an average sulfur content 
much lower than commercially available fuels.94 
Finally, SIPs must include provisions for inspection and mainte-
nance (11M) programs.95 These programs ensure that in-use vehicles 
are properly maintained and comply with the applicable emission 
standards.96 
4. Federal Preemption and a Commitment to the Protection of the 
Automobile Industry 
The primary purpose of federal preemption in the area of vehicle 
emission regulation is to ensure a national uniformity of air quality 
standards.97 Congress sought to avoid placing an undue burden upon 
manufacturers of motor vehicles which would result from a multiplic-
ity of various state standards.98 If each state could establish its own 
emission standards, then automobile manufacturers would potentially 
have to create a different vehicle for each state. This would result in 
an extreme burden on the automobile manufacturers.99 
Congress made one exception, though, to the federal automobile 
emission standards. lOo Congress declared that any state which had 
adopted its own vehicle emission standards prior to March 30, 1966 
could maintain and continue to adopt its own standards.10! The state's 
standards and programs, however, are subject to EPA approval.102 A 
waiver of preemption must be obtained for each new program.103 
California was the only state to have enacted such standards for 
motor vehicle emissions within the statutory time constraints.104 Hence, 
93 See Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 2, at 8; MVMA I, supra note 10, at 1337. 
94 See Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 2, at 8; MVMA I, supra note 10, at 1337. It has 
been stated that indolene fuel has an average sulfur content of 18 parts per million, whereas 
the average commercially available fuel has an average sulfur content which can exceed 1000 
parts per million. See Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 2, at 8, 15. 
95 See 42 U.S.C. § 7511 (Supp. IV 1992), cited in MVMA I, supra note 10, at 1336-37. 
96 See id. 
97 See MVMA I, supra note 10, at 1337. 
98 See id. 
99 Cf id. 
100 See id. at 1337--38. 
101 42 U.S.C. § 7543 (1988), cited in MVMA I, supra note 10, at 1337-38. 
102 See id. 
103 See id. 42 U.S.C. § 7543 (1988) states in part that no waiver shall be granted if the EPA 
finds that (a) the determination of the state is arbitrary and capricious, (b) such state does not 
need such standards to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions, or (c) such state stand-
ards and accompanying enforcement procedures are not consistent with section 7521(a) of this 
title. 
104 See MVMA I, supra note 10, at 1338. 
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the effect was to create an exception for the state of California alone.105 
As a result, automobile manufacturers were protected from having to 
deal with more than two different sets of emission standards. They 
were left with the federal standards and the California standards.106 
Other states with mobile source pollutant problems were eventu-
ally given the option of adopting the California vehicle emission pro-
gram in place of the less stringent federal program.I07 Congress en-
acted this option in 1977 because various states were having trouble 
meeting the Clean Air Act's air quality standards. At that time only 
a few states had met the NAAQS for ozone, and many had failed to 
meet the carbon monoxide standard. lOS 
Other states may adopt and enforce the California standards with-
out EPA approval, however, only if "such standards are identical to 
the California standards."l()9 Because the standards adopted by the 
states must be identical, the Clean Air Act still provides for the 
protection of automobile manufacturers. The auto-manufacturers still 
have to produce at most two different types of motor vehicles to 
comply with the various emission standards. l1° 
The 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act added another require": 
ment to the option of adopting the California standards. Congress 
declared a "no-third-vehicle" requirement.111 The thrust of this re-
quirement is to prevent the states from adopting new tailpipe emis-
sion standards which cause or have the effect of causing the manufac-
turers to have to create a new vehicle or engine. The no-third-vehicle 
requirement was included to further protect the automobile industry 
from having to produce an additional vehicle other than the federal 
standard vehicle and the California vehicle. 112 
By granting states the ability to control air pollution in any manner 
they deem best, Congress has enabled the states to best meet the 
105 See id. 
106 Cf id.; see also Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 2, at 6. 
107 See Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 2, at 7; see also 42 U.S.C § 7507 (1988). 
100 See MVMA I, supra note 10, at 1338. 
109 42 U.S.C. § 7507 (1988). 
110 See Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 2, at 7. 
111 
Nothing in this section ... shall be construed as authorizing any such state to prohibit 
of limit, directly or indirectly, the manufacture or sale of a new motor vehicle or motor 
vehicle engine that is certified in California as meeting California standards, or to take 
any action of any kind to create, or have the effect of creating, a motor vehicle or motor 
vehicle engine different than a motor vehicle or engine certified in California under 
California standards (a "third vehicle") or otherwise create such third vehicle. 
42 U.S.C. § 7507 (Supp. IV 1992). 
112 See MVMA I, supra note 10, at 1338. 
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ambient air quality standards. The states' freedom to control air 
pollution, however, must be balanced against Congress's intent to 
protect the automobile industry from potentially having to make fifty-
one different types of automobiles.1I3 Thus, in summary, the preemi-
nent goal of the Clean Air Act is to protect public health by improving 
and maintaining the air quality in the United States. In light of this 
goal, however, two competing interests must be balanced: state free-
dom in regulating air pollution, and protection of the automobile man-
ufacturers from having to create additional vehicles other than the 
federal standard vehicle and the California standard vehicle. 
C. The California Autorrwbile Emissions Program 
The California Air Resources Board (CARB) is the agency in charge 
of establishing and implementing the motor vehicle emission stand-
ards for the state of CaliforniaY4 CARB also administers the "cer-
tification" and "in-use" testing in California.u5 
In 1990, CARB adopted the regulatory program known as the "Low 
Emission Vehicle/Clean Fuels" program ("LEV/CF").1l6 This program 
has three main components.ll7 First, it sets new levels of emission 
standards for mobile sources. lIS Light-duty vehicles are categorized 
based upon these standards.1I9 The categories are: transitional low 
emission vehicles (TLEVs), low emission vehicles (LEVs), ultra-low 
emission vehicles (ULEVs), and zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs), the 
most common type being electric vehicles.l~ 
The second aspect of the LEV/CF program is the mandatory phase-
in of ZEV S.121 By 1998, two percent of all light-duty vehicles sold in 
California must be ZEVS.122 This percentage rises to five percent in 
2001, then ten percent in 2003.123 
113 See id. at 1338-39. 
114 See Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 2, at 8. 
115 See id. at 8-9. 
116 MVMA I, supra note 10, at 1339. 
117 Id. 
118 See id. 
119Id. 
120 See id.; Letter from Barbara K wetz, supra note 17. 
121 See MVMA I, supra note 10, at 1339-40. With the exception of ZEVs, manufacturers are 
not required to comply with the phase in schedule. Manufacturers can produce any category of 
low emission vehicles so long as the overall fleet average is met. However, manufacturers who 
produce more low emission vehicles than necessary will earn credits which may be used in the 
future, sold, or traded to other auto-manufacturers. Id. at 1339-40. 
122 See id. 
123Id. 
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The third component of the LEV/CF program is the clean fuel 
component.l24 CARB tightened its regulations concerning the compo-
sition of commercially available gasoline.125 In November 1991, CARB 
adopted the "Phase II reformulated commercial gasoline" require-
ment which prohibits the sale of gasoline with a sulfur content higher 
than eighty parts per million after March, 1996.126 Also, for model 
years 1993 and after, CARB is allowing auto-manufacturers to certify 
their vehicles on either indolene or "Phase II reformulated certifica-
tion gasoline."127 This Phase II fuel has a similar sulfur content to 
indolene.l28 
Section 209 of the Clean Air Act requires California to obtain a 
waiver from the EPA before it can enforce its LEV program. CARB 
obtained the waiver on January 7, 1993Yll) CARB did not submit a 
waiver for the commercial fuel requirement because it is not required 
to obtain EPA approval for that portion of the programYl() 
D. Massachusetts's Adoption of the California LEV Program 
Under the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, Massachusetts must 
show a fifteen percent reduction in VOC emissions from the 1990 
baseline by 1996, and an additional three percent reduction each year 
thereafter until the N AAQS attainment level is reached.131 If, through 
modeling analysis, Massachusetts determines that the yearly percent-
age reductions are insufficient to meet the ozone standard by 1999, 
then it must adopt additional emission reduction programs adequate 
to meet the standard.132 In addition, Massachusetts must show that 
there are sufficient ongoing programs to maintain compliance with the 
ambient air quality standards in the future, while taking into account 
any new growth in emissions production.l33 
124 See id. at 1340. 
125 See Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 2, at 9-10. 
126 See id. 
127 This should not be confused with Phase II reformulated commercial gasoline which will be 
sold commercially in California in 1996. See id. at 9 n.2. 
128 Id. 
129 See MVMA I, supra note 10, at 1341; see also Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 2, at 
12. 
130 See Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 2, at 12. 
131 See Memorandum from Department of Environmental Protection Relating DEP's Re-
sponse To Comments Received During Public Hearing For 310 C.M.R. 7.40; Entitled Response 
To Comments, 310 C.M.R. 7.40, Massachusetts Low Emission Vehicles Standard 11 (Jan. 31, 
1992). 
132 See 42 U.S.C. § 7502 (Supp. IV 1992). 
133 See Letter from Barbara Kwetz, supra note 17, at 12. 
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1. M.G.L. c. 111, § 142k 
In response to the growing pollution problem in Massachusetts, the 
Massachusetts state legislature adopted chapter 111, section 142k of 
the General Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.l34 Section 
142k requires the DEP to adopt motor vehicle emissions standards 
based on California's standards, unless the California standards will 
not achieve greater motor vehicle pollution reductions than the fed-
eral standards.135 In short, Massachusetts is required to adopt the 
California vehicle emissions control program unless doing so will not 
achieve cleaner air than the federal standards and compliance pro-
gram.136 
2. The Legislative Commission and the DEP's Decision 
In January, 1992, the Massachusetts state legislature created a 
commission to study the California LEV /CF program and make a 
recommendation as to whether Massachusetts should adopt the pro-
gram.137 Prior to the commission's determination, the DEP held three 
days of public hearings during which it received oral and written 
comments from the public and other parties concerning the adoption 
of the California program.l38 As a result of these meetings, the DEP 
made a determination that the California LEV standards would re-
duce emissions of automobile pollutants to an extent greater than the 
federal standards.l39 Hence, on January 31, 1992, the DEP complied 
with the statutory mandate and opted into the California program.l40 
Massachusetts did not adopt the entire California LEV /CF pro-
gram, however.141 First, the DEP adopted the LEV portion of the 
program.l42 Accordingly, any new vehicle that is certified by CARB 
as meeting the California standards can be registered in Massachu-
134 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 111, § 142k (1990). 
135 Massachusetts may adopt motor vehicle emissions standards based on the California's 
standards unless said emissions standards and a compliance program similar to the state of 
California's will not achieve, in the aggregate, greater motor vehicle pollution reductions than 
the federal standards and compliance program. See id. 
136 See Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 2, at 13. To the best of the author's knowledge, 
no one has seriously asserted that the California standards will not achieve cleaner air than the 
less stringent federal standards. 
137 See Complaint, supra note 5, at 16; Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 2, at 16. 
138 See Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 2, at 13. 
139 See id. 
140 See id. 
141 See Complaint, supra note 5, at 15. 
142 See id.; see also Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 2, at 13. 
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setts.143 Second, the DEP also adopted the California ZEV mandate.144 
Thus, by 1998, two percent of all cars sold in Massachusetts must be 
ZEVS.145 As with the California program, the percentage increases to 
five percent in model year 2001 and ten percent for model year 2003.146 
The DEP, however, opted not to adopt the clean fuel portion of the 
California program.147 The DEP concluded, after a cost-benefit analy-
sis, that the cost of implementing the clean fuel portion far out-
weighed the benefits it would provide.148 California has estimated that 
the cost of implementing the Phase II gasoline is approximately $7,000 
to $11,000 per ton of ozone precursors removed.149 This compares to 
$1,100 to $1,400 per ton removed if only the LEV program is imple-
mented.l50 The DEP determined that since Massachusetts's air is actu-
ally much cleaner than California's, the cost of implementing the Phase 
II gasoline was excessive.l5l 
Massachusetts did, however, adopt the federally reformulated gaso-
line.152 In August, 1991, Governor Weld elected to require the sale of 
the federal reformulated gasoline effective March, 1995.153 This gaso-
line has a maximum sulfur limit of 500 parts per million (ppm), and is 
the cleanest gasoline available without having to secure a waiver from 
the EPA.154 
In March, 1993, the state legislative commission issued its report.155 
It voted to endorse the DEP's regulations.156 The commission also 
endorsed DEP's decision not to adopt the California Phase II fueU57 
143 See Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 2, at 13-14. 
144 See Complaint, supra note 5, at 15-16. 
140 See id. 
146 See id. 
147 See id. at 15; see also Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 2, at 15. 
148 See Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 2, at 15. 
149 Id. at 15 n.S. 
150 Id. 
151 See id. 
152 Id. at 14-15. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 15. States, other than California, are prohibited from regulating fuel already regu-
lated by the EPA unless they obtain a waiver from the EPA. 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (1988 & Supp. 
IV 1992); see Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 2, at 14. An exception is made for states 
having trouble complying with the owne NAAQS. See Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 
2, at 14. Those states may opt into the federal reformulated fuel program. 
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III. DEVELOPING A HERMENEUTICAL METHODl58 
"/l n'y a pas de hors-texte."I59 What does Derrida mean by this? At 
first glance, it appears he is siding with the textualists who claim that 
the only meaning to be derived from a text is the meaning provided 
by the words existing within the "four-corners" of the document.l60 
This is not the case, however. The following will unpack the meaning 
of Derrida's statement. In unpacking the statement, a hermeneutical 
approach will be developed with which to interpret the Clean Air Act 
as applied in the controversy between the DEP and the auto-manu-
facturers. 
When interpreting statutes, it is critical to remember that words 
do not mean, people mean.161 People have experiences, ask questions, 
gain insights and understanding, develop judgments, and make deci-
sionsYi2 The contents of these cognitional activities are the personal 
and active products of the individual. They are also the sources from 
which meaning is derived. 
158 There is at times a marked difference in the use of the term "Deconstruction" in the legal 
literature as opposed to the philosophical literature. In the legal literature, the term is often 
used to mean a "taking apart" or "selective adherence to," or refer to a method of criticizing by 
showing the text to be self-contradictory or indeterminate. For example, a judge may decon-
struct the facts of a case by "taking apart" the facts as a whole picture and selectively empha-
sizing certain portions of the whole. See Anthony D' Amato, The Ultimate Injustice: When A 
Court Misstates The Facts, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1313, 1343-47 (1990); see also J.M. Balkin, 
Deconstructive Practice And Legal Theory, 96 YALE L. J. 743, 743-44 (1987). Throughout the 
rest of this Comment, the term "deconstruction" will be used in this way. 
In the philosophical writings, "deconstruction" holds a different meaning. In developing a 
hermeneutical approach with which to interpret the Clean Air Act, this Comment relies upon 
the philosophical writings of Jacques Derrida and Bernard Lonergan. This approach is decon-
structive in the philosophical sense of the word. (It should be noted that by setting out the 
history and purposes of the Clean Air Act in the previous sections, the use of a deconstructive 
hermeneutical method in the philosophical sense of the term has already begun. Hence, we are 
already committed to the method which will be further developed in this section.) As stated 
above, however, this Comment will not use the term "deconstruction" in the philosophical sense, 
but in the sense described in the legal literature. 
159 "There is nothing outside the text." JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY 158 (Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak trans., 1976). 
160 See, e.g., Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 467-482 (1989) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). 
161 See BERNARD J.F. LONERGAN, INSIGHT: A STUDY IN HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 553-58, 
568-73 (1978). This is what is meant by the often quoted phrase, "language is not self-interpret-
ing." 
162 See Bernard Lonergan, Cognitional Structure, in 4 COLLECTED WORKS OF BERNARD 
LONERGAN 205, 206"'{)9 (1988). 
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Words are instrumental acts of meaning, expressed by people who, 
through cognitional structure, are the sources of meaning.I63 Words 
are only signs of what is present in a person's mind.164 A person's true 
thoughts and real meanings must be mediated through the use of 
words.165 Hence, words express a subject's meaning by externalizing 
the meaning. Words carry the meaning out into the open for exami-
nation and interpretation.l66 
It follows that words and expressions of thought are not true or 
false.167 Expressions are related to .truth and falsity by relating that 
which is true or falseY18 Words and expressions are merely adequate 
or inadequate as carriers of meaning.l69 
Inadequacy in carriers of meaning may result from two situations. 
First, there may be a discontinuity between what the subject who is 
utilizing the words seeks to express and the words that the subject 
chooses in attempting to externalize what he or she means.17° The 
subject may not express himself or herself with sufficient clarity to 
impart the desired understanding to the reader of the words. Second, 
there may be a discontinuity between the individual experiencing-
that is reading or attempting to understand-the instrumental acts 
of meaning and the instrumental acts of meaning themselves.l7l The 
reader may not have the necessary and required insights to fully 
understand the terms being used. 
These discontinuities between the individuals and the terms, how-
ever, do not result in subjectivism or necessitate a subjective inter-
pretation of the carriers of meaning. The inadequacies can be over-
come through understanding.172 The reader must gain understanding 
of the insights which guided the choice of terms used. For example, 
1&1 LONERGAN, supra note 161, at 357 ("The instrumental act of meaning is ... the use of 
words or symbols in a spoken, written, or merely imagined utterance."); id. at 569 (sources of 
meaning lie in the experiential, intellectual, and rational levels of knowing, i.e. the cognitional 
structure of individuals). 
164 See Balkin, supra note 158, at 757. 
165 [d. 
166 This is not to deny that words have references. Meaning would be impossible to ascertain 
if they did not. However, this does not imply that words have meaning. Meaning is still in the 
individual who uses the words and their references to express him or herself. We must come to 
understand the references and their relations in order to understand meaning. 
167 LONERGAN, supra note 161, at 556. 
168 See id. 
169 [d. 
170 See id. 
171 See id. 
172 [d. at 558-59 ('To appropriate a truth [true meaning] is to make it one's own. The essential 
appropriation of truth is cognitional."). 
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the reader must understand the social policies guiding the author's 
choices of terms. The author's intent must also be understood. The 
reader must have insights about the goals which the author sought to 
accomplish in choosing the particular terms. In short, the reader must 
understand the "story" of the terms. 
To understand the story of the terms, the reader must unpack the 
terms. By unpacking the terms, the reader will come to fully under-
stand the meaning which the author means in using those terms.l73 
This is what Derrida meant when he said "Il n'y a pas de hors-
texte."174 We do not go outside the text to discover the meaning of the 
text. This is because the terms of the text have an ontological life of 
their own. They have a story which must be unpacked in order to 
determine the true meaning which the author has meant.175 
Hence, in order to understand the Clean Air Act, an individual must 
understand the history of the Clean Air Act, its contextual begin-
nings, its purpose and goals, and the policies behind the Act. In short, 
an individual must fully understand the "story" of the Clean Air 
Act.176 
IV. INTERPRETING THE LEGAL ISSUES SURROUNDING 
MASSACHUSETrS'S ADOPTION OF THE CALIFORNIA LEV PROGRAM 
Having adopted the California LEV program, the DEP found itself 
the defendant in a lawsuit.177 The auto-manufacturers claim that in 
adopting the LEV portion of the California tailpipe emissions-control 
program, the DEP violated the Clean Air Act.l78 The auto-manufac-
turers made several arguments to uphold their claim. First, they 
stated that the DEP's decision to exclude the clean fuel portion of the 
173 Those who hold to a textualist (four corners) henneneutical method claim that it is not the 
duty of the courts to inquire what the legislature meant; the duty of the courts is to seek only 
what the statute means. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Theary Of Legal Interpretation, 
12 HARv. L. REV. 417, 419 (1899). However, this Comment argues that detennining what the 
statute means requires unpacking the story of the terms used in the statute. In so doing we 
must inquire about such things as purpose, legislative intent, social policies, and the like. True 
meaning can not be found without doing such. 
174 DERRIDA, supra note 159, at 158. 
175 In stating "Il n'y a pas de hors-texte," Derrida illustrated his point. We had to unpack the 
tenns in order to fully understand what Derrida meant. If we had held to a textualist approach, 
we would have interpreted the words literally and arrived at the opposite meaning of the point 
that Derrida was trying to make. 
176 Having stated our henneneutical method, we can now fully understand the purposes 
behind sections I and II of this Comment. These sections explicate the story of the Clean Air 
Act, emphasizing the most relevant and pressing points. 
177 See generally Complaint, supra note 5, at 1; AAMA I, supra note 3, at *1~. 
178 See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 5, at 4-5; AAMA I, supra note 3, at *1~. 
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California LEV /CF program violated the "identicality" requirement 
of section 177 of the Clean Air Act.179 They also claimed that the DEP's 
failure to adopt the CF portion effectively forced the auto-manufac-
turers to create a "third vehicle" in violation of section 177.180 Thirdly, 
the plaintiffs alleged that the adoption of the ZEV sales mandate, a 
component of the LEV portion of the California program, violated 
section 177 in two ways: by indirectly limiting sales of other types of 
vehicles,181 and by forcing the auto-manufacturers to construct a third 
vehicleYl2 Finally, the auto-manufacturers claimed that the DEP vio-
lated the Clean Air Act by adopting California standards that had not 
received a federal waiver at the time of the adoption.18s 
Throughout the discussion of these issues, the reader is first pre-
sented with the plaintiffs' arguments, followed by the defendant's 
arguments. Following the presentation of these arguments, each issue 
is analyzed following the hermeneutical method as developed in sec-
tion III. Finally, a solution to the controversy or controversies sur-
rounding each issue is presented. 184 
A. The Identicality Issue 
Section 177 of the Clean Air Act allows any state to "adopt and 
enforce for any model year standards relating to the control of emis-
sions from new motor vehicles" if those standards are identical to 
the California standards for which a waiver from the EPA has been 
granted.l85 The issue here is what it means to be "identical" to the 
California standards for the control of emissions.l86 
The auto-manufacturers argue that the DEP has violated the Clean 
Air Act by not adopting the clean fuel component of the California 
LEV/CF program.l87 They point to the fact that California recognized 
that the clean fuel component is necessary if the emission standards 
179 Complaint, supra note 5, at 4; see AAMA I, supra note 3, at *1-2. 
18> Complaint, supra note 5, at 4; see AAMA I, supra note 3, at *1-2. 
181 Complaint, supra note 5, at 5; see AAMA I, supra note 3, at *1-2. 
182 Compliant, supra note 5, at 5; see AAMA I, supra note 3, at *1-2. 
183 Complaint, supra note 5, at 4; see AAMA I, supra note 3, at *1-2. 
184 Other issues are raised in the case. These issues, however, not lending to the discussion of 
deconstruction, are not discussed. 
185 See 42 U.S.C. § 7507 (1988); see also Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 2, at 24. 
100 See Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 2, at 23-24; see also AAMA I, supra note 3, at 
*3--4; MVMA I, supra note 10, at 1342. 
187 Complaint, supra note 5, at 19; see AAMA I, supra note 3, at *3--4; MVMA I, supra note 
10, at 1342. 
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are to be achieved.188 Furthermore, they note that CARB also recog-
nized that the clean fuel requirement is necessary to the operation 
and maintenance of the program to assure continuous emission reduc-
tion.189 Hence, they argue that the phrase "standards relating to the 
control of emissions" should be interpreted broadly to include the 
clean fuel component.190 Hence, by not adopting the clean fuel compo-
nent, the Massachusetts standards "relating to the control of emis-
sions" are not "identical" to California's standards.l9l Because they are 
not identical, the DEP has violated the Clean Air Act.192 
The auto-manufacturers also argue that in order for the standards 
to be identical, they must have identical "practical effects," as well as 
being identical on their face.193 They state that without the California 
fuels, the level of emission reductions in Massachusetts will be sub-
stantially less than in California. Hence, the practical effect of Massa-
chusetts's adoption of the California LEV program is different from 
the practical effect of the California program.194 As a result, the auto-
manufacturers again claim that the DEP has violated the identicality 
requirement.195 
The DEP, on the other hand, claims that absence of the clean fuel 
component does not violate the Clean Air Act.196 The DEP relies on 
the plain language of section 177.197 The critical language allows a state 
to adopt standards only if they are identical to those California stand-
ards "for which a waiver has been granted."198 According to the DEP, 
this means that a state may not adopt any California standards which 
have not received the EPA's approvaU99 The DEP points out that 
California has not applied for a waiver for the clean fuel component 
of its LEV/CF program. Indeed, California does not need a waiver 
188 Complaint, supra note 5, at 19-20. 
189 See id. 
190 Ct Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 2, at 24. 
191 ct id.; see Complaint, supra note 5, at 19-20. 
192 See Complaint, supra note 5, at 20. 
193 See Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 78, at 34. 
194 See id. at 34--35. 
195 See id. at 34--35. 
196 See Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 2, at 23-25; see also AAMA I, supra note 3, at 
*3-4; MVMA I, supra note 10, at 1342. 
197 See Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 2, at 23-25; see also AAMA I, supra note 3, at 
*3-4; MVMA I, supra note 10, at 1342. 
198 See Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 2, at 23-25; see also AAMA I, supra note 3, at 
*3-4; MVMA I, supra note 10, at 1342. 
199 See AAMA I, supra note 3, at *3-4; MVMA I, supra note 10, at 1342. 
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for this component.200 Hence, the DEP claims that because California 
did not receive a waiver for the clean fuel component, the DEP could 
not adopt the clean fuel component.201 
The auto-manufacturers could respond to the DEP's argument by 
stating that although the EPA does not directly review the clean fuel 
component, it does not have to. This is because California receives an 
automatic waiver of its clean fuel component.202 Accordingly, the term 
"waiver" in section 177 should be interpreted broadly to include the 
automatic waiver also. Hence, the auto-manufacturers could conclude 
that Massachusetts must adopt the clean fuel component to be in 
compliance with the Clean Air Act.203 
This counter-argument, however, ignores the fact that Congress, 
separate from its preemption of motor vehicle emissions, preempts 
state enforcement of vehicle fuel regulations.204 Although California 
is exempted from this provision-which results in the effect of an 
automatic waiver-the other forty-nine states are not.205 The other 
states may avoid the federal preemption only by demonstrating to the 
EPA that a more stringent fuel regulation is needed for the state to 
attain the NAAQS.206 For example, Massachusetts could only adopt 
the California clean fuel component by proving the necessity of the 
fuel for meeting the NAAQS. EPA approval, however, is not neces-
sary for Massachusetts to opt into the California LEV program.207 
Congress has treated these two areas differently.2G<l Hence, to suggest 
that Massachusetts must adopt the clean fuel component simply be-
cause California received an automatic waiver contradicts the terms 
of the federal fuel preemption portion of the Clean Air Act. Massa-
chusetts can not adopt the California clean fuel program without 
obtaining EPA approvaJ.209 
In arguing for their respective interpretations, both parties have 
deconstructed the Clean Air Act. Both parties have divorced various 
terms from their "story" in their attempt to achieve their desired 
200 See Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 2, at 24. 
201 See id. at 24-25; see also AAMA I, supra note 3, at *3-4; MVMA I, supra note 10, at 
1342-43. 
2<12 See AAMA I, supra note 3, at *3; MVMA I, supra note 10, at 1342-43. 
200 See AAMA I, supra note 3, at *3; MVMA I, supra note 10, at 1342-43. 
204 See 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); see also AAMA I, supra note 3, at *3-4; 
MVMA I, supra note 10, at 1342-43. 
205 See MVMA I, supra note 10, at 1343. 
200 See 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); see also MVMA I, supra note 10, at 1343. 
207 See Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 2, at 23-24; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7507 (1988). 
208 See MVMA I, supra note 10, at 1343. 
209 See Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 2, at 24. 
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goals. The auto-manufacturers have done so by seeking a broad inter-
pretation of the term "identical." Their arguments, however, would 
result in one of two events taking place. Either Massachusetts would 
have to repeal M.G.L. c. 111, § 142k, or Massachusetts would have to 
apply for a waiver from the EPA for the clean fuel program. The first 
resultant situation ignores the preeminent concern of the Clean Air 
Act, which is to protect the public health. The adoption of the LEV 
program would improve the air quality in the state of Massachusetts, 
thus protecting the health of the citizens residing in that state. The 
resultant second situation denies Massachusetts the freedom to regu-
late air pollution in any manner it deems sufficient and necessary. 
The DEP seeks an interpretation of the statute which follows the 
"plain meaning" of the text. Such a hermeneutical method divorces 
the terms from their stories; it deconstructs the Clean Air Act by 
focusing on the term "identical" exclusively. Hence, this method is 
fraught with problems. The question must be asked, what does it 
mean to interpret the Clean Air Act using the plain meaning method. 
The DEP seems to suggest that such a method refers to the most 
obvious meaning of the terms of the statute as understood in the 
immediate present. The most obvious meaning, however, often leads 
to absurd results. For example, the phrase, "Napoleon was alive and 
well in 1985," is patently false according to such an interpretative 
method. This phrase, however, is factually true. When we examine the 
story of the term "Napoleon," we learn that Napoleon was a cat, and 
indeed he was alive and well at such a time. 
If the defendant is not referring to the most obvious meaning of a 
term as understood in the immediate present, it is not clear what it 
is referring to, or what is sought in such a hermeneutical method. 
Hence, since it has been shown that either the plain meaning method 
of interpreting is fraught with peril, or that the defendant is at best 
nebulous as to what is meant by such a method, such a method should 
not be followed. 
In order to solve this issue, the term "identical" must be unpacked. 
As has been stated, the purpose of the Clean Air Act is to protect the 
public health.210 This was the paramount and preeminent concern of 
Congress in framing the Act.211 In seeking to protect the public health, 
though, we must also bear in mind Congress's desire to balance the 
states' freedom to control air pollution in any manner they deem 
sufficient and necessary against its desire to protect the automobile 
210 See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text. 
211 Muskie, supra note 31, at 14. 
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industry from having to manufacture a third vehicle. These concerns 
form the story of the term "identical" as it is found within the context 
of the Clean Air Act. Hence, we must interpret this term in such a 
way so that the results of the interpretation best meet these concerns. 
The LEV program alone will benefit the public health by greatly 
reducing mobile source pollutants. Hence, Congress's aim of protect-
ing the public health is not undermined by Massachusetts adopting 
only the LEV portion of California's LEV /CF program. In addition, 
the LEV program alone does not force the auto-manufacturers to 
build a third vehicle. Thus, they are also protected. By allowing Mas-
sachusetts to adopt the LEV program without the CF program, the 
court will also be protecting Massachusetts's freedom to regulate air 
pollution. Hence, the concerns of Congress are completely and fully 
met by interpreting the term "identical" so as to allow Massachusetts 
to adopt the LEV program without the concomitant CF portion. 
B. The Third Vehicle Issue 
The 1990 amendment to section 177 asserts in part that no state 
shall take any action to create, or to have the effect of creating, a 
motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine different than a motor vehicle 
or engine certified under California standards or otherwise create 
such a third vehicle.212 This amendment protects the automobile man-
ufacturers from having to develop more than two types of vehicles: 
the federal vehicle and the California vehicle. The issue under discus-
sion here is whether the DEP's adoption of the California LEV stand-
ards without the adoption of the clean fuel standards will force the 
automobile manufacturers to design and create a third vehicle differ-
ent from the federal car and the car sold in California.213 
The auto-manufacturers argue that the higher sulfur content in the 
Massachusetts fuels-as opposed to the California fuels-will cause a 
significant negative impact on the functioning of the catalytic con-
verter installed in every new California car.214 This will seriously affect 
the vehicle's ability to pass the in-use recall tests.215 As a result the 
auto-manufacturers claim that they will have to do either one of two 
things. Either they will have to design a new catalytic converter for 
21242 U.S.C. § 7507 (Supp. IV 1992). 
213 See Complaint, supra note 5, at 20-21; see also Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 2, 
at 44-52. 
214 See Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 78, at 24--28; see also Complaint, supra note 5, at 
20-21. 
215 Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 78, at 26. 
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Massachusetts cars, which is tantamount to creating a third vehicle, 
or they will have to more frequently replace the catalytic converter 
on Massachusetts cars which will result in an undue burden.216 Either 
option, the plaintiffs claim, violates the third car regulation or its 
underlying policy, which is to protect the automobile manufacturers 
from the undue burden which multiple state vehicle emission stand-
ards would create.217 
The auto-manufacturers also argue that the attachment mechanism 
for the catalytic converter will have to be changed in Massachusetts 
cars.218 They state that the impact of the higher level of sulfur will 
cause, in certain very high mileage vehicles, the car's On Board Diag-
nostic System (OBD H)-which will be installed in every new Cali-
fornia car beginning in the mid 1990s-to activate the Malfunction 
Indicator Light (MIL) more often in Massachusetts than in Califor-
nia.219 Hence, when the car owner, still within the emissions system 
warranty period-which under the LEV /CF is 100,000 miles-brings 
the car in for servicing, the catalytic converter will have to be re-
placed.2ID 
In California, the catalytic converter is welded to the engine.221 The 
auto-manufacturers claim that, in order to reduce the cost of replacing 
the converter, the attachment mechanism design for the catalytic 
converter will have to be changed for Massachusetts cars.222 The 
converter will have to be attached with a bolt and flange instead of 
welded.223 Consequently, the plaintiffs argue that the necessitated 
change to the bolt and flange is tantamount to creating a third vehi-
cle.224 
On the other hand, the DEP argues that the sulfur impairment of 
the catalytic converter will not impede a car's ability to pass an in-use 
recall test.225 In performing the recall test, the Federal Test Procedure 
is used.226 Part of this procedure involves taking necessary steps to 
reverse sulfur impairment prior to the testing.227 In addition, the 
216 See id. at 26-28. 
217 See id. at 26-28; Complaint, supra note 5, at 20-21. 
218 See Plaintiffs Memorandum, supra note 78, at 26-28. 
219 See id.; see also Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 2, at 54. 
220 See Plaintiffs Memorandum, supra note 78, at 26-28. 
221 See id. 
222 See id. 
223 [d. 
224 See id. 
225 See Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 2, at 61-66. 
226 See id. at 66. 
227 See id. Sulfur impairment can be reversed by simply heating the catalytic converter to 700 
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in-use test utilizes indolene or Phase II gasoline, which has a sig-
nificantly lower sulfur content than the commercially available gaso-
lines.228 Thus, the sulfur content of Massachusetts gasoline will not 
affect the outcome of the in-use test.229 
In addition, the DEP also argues that the design change of the 
attachment mechanism for catalytic converters does not constitute 
the construction of a third vehicle.230 Only material differences, that 
is differences which create an undue burden on the car manufacturer, 
constitute the construction of a third vehicle.231 The change from a 
welded method to a bolt and flange method hardly rises to the level 
of creating a third vehicle.232 
The DEP also argues that the design problem that the car manu-
facturers face in relation to the Massachusetts cars is the same design 
problem that they face in relation to cars sold in California.233 Cars 
sold in California do not strictly stay in California.234 Millions of people 
leave the state temporarily every year for business and pleasure. In 
addition, thousands of people leave the state permanently in order to 
relocate.235 In fact, according to the motor vehicle records, an esti-
mated 283,000 vehicles left California last year alone.236 This is more 
than all the new light-duty vehicles sold in Massachusetts last year.237 
When these cars leave, they then operate on the higher sulfur gaso-
lines.238 Hence, the converter design problem that the automobile 
manufacturers face is worse in relation to the California cars than to 
the Massachusetts cars.239 Thus, to complain about the Massachusetts 
car and its design problem is frivolous. 
Lastly, the DEP argues that the tests conducted on the catalytic 
converters are flawed.240 Testing was done with fuel containing a 
sulfur level of 600 ppm.241 No testing was done on the converters using 
degrees Celsius. This is done in everyday driving. It is also accomplished by driving for a period 
with low-sulfur gasoline. See id. 
228 See id. at 8; see also MVMA I, supra note 10, at 1344. 
229 See Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 2, at 614>6. 
2aJ See id. at 54-55. 
231 See id. at 55 n.43. 
232 See id. 
233 See id. at 59-61. 
234 See id. 
235 See id. 
236 See id. 
237 See id. 
238 See id. 
239 See id. 
240 See id. at 55-58. 
241 Id. at 56. 
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the federally reformulated fuel which contains a much lower sulfur 
level. The federally reformulated fuel has an expected sulfur level of 
half that amount, and the maximum allowable sulfur level of 500 ppm 
is well below that amount.242 Since Massachusetts has opted into the 
federally reformulated fuel program, the test results are flawed in 
relation to Massachusetts vehicles.243 Hence, the argument that the 
catalytic converter will fail and have to be replaced is irrelevant 
because it is based upon this study. 
In arguing for their respective positions, both parties have decon-
structed the Clean Air Act. Each party seeks to divorce the third 
vehicle passage from its "story," and interpret it in such a way so as 
to achieve their desired goals. The auto-manufacturers seek a broad 
interpretation of the third vehicle passage so as to allow a small design 
change to be interpreted as a de facto third vehicle. The DEP seeks 
a very narrow interpretation of the third vehicle passage so that the 
design change to the catalytic converter attachment mechanism will 
not result in the court's finding that the change results in a de facto 
third vehicle. Neither party, however, sought to interpret the passage 
within the context of its story. 
The crux of this third vehicle argument is whether a small design 
change on the attachment mechanism of the catalytic converter will 
result in such an undue burden upon the auto-manufacturers that it 
creates a de facto third vehicle.244 When deciding this, the courts must 
weigh the burden placed upon the auto-manufacturers against Mas-
sachusetts's right to control mobile source pollution in the manner it 
deems best. The balancing, though, must be done while keeping in 
mind the paramount concern of the Clean Air Act, which is to protect 
public health. 
If the courts find that a de facto third vehicle has been created, then 
Massachusetts will be federally preempted in its freedom to regulate 
mobile source pollution. Massachusetts will be left with the option of 
either repealing M.G.L. c. 111, § 142k, or adopting the CF program. 
There is no doubt that a design change creates a burden for the 
auto-manufacturers. The change, however, in the attachment mecha-
nism is merely a change from a welding method to a bolting method. 
242 See id. at 56-57. 
243 See id. at 14-15. 
244 Regardless of whether or not the courts find that the catalytic converter fails the in-use 
tests more often with the less clean Massachusetts gasoline, if the courts find that the redesign 
of the attachment mechanism is not sufficient to create a third vehicle, the defendants win on 
this count. If the redesign does not create a third vehicle, then it does not matter if the catalytic 
converter fails the in-use tests more often. Hence, the crux of the issue is as stated above. 
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This change does not justify federal intrusion upon Massachusetts's 
right to regulate mobile source pollution. Massachusetts knows the 
best manner and methods to control air pollution in its state. Massa-
chusetts is best able to balance the methods necessary to control 
mobile source pollution against the expense to its citizens. A small 
design change in the attachment of the catalytic converter does not 
justify the court overriding the knowledge that the state has with 
regard to the control of its air pollution and the expenses that such 
control demands. 
In addition, concluding that the balance weighs in favor of the state 
will not undermine the goal of the Clean Air Act to protect public 
health. Massachusetts will adopt the LEV program which will further 
the goal. In contrast, a conclusion that the balancing weighs against 
the state would violate one of two goals of the Clean Air Act. If the 
state were forced to repeal M.G.L. c. 111, § 142k, then the primary 
goal of the Clean Air Act would be violated. Public health would not 
be best protected. If the state were forced to adopt the CF portion, 
then the state's freedom would be restricted. 
Lastly, it should be noted that one of the minor goals of the Clean 
Air Act is to force the development of new and better technology.245 
By forcing the auto-manufacturers to develop new and better meth-
ods of attaching the catalytic converters, the courts will be upholding 
a goal of the Clean Air Act, and assisting in the development of such 
technology. 
C. The ZEV Issues 
Massachusetts's adoption of the zero-emission vehicle requirement 
raises two distinct issues: the issue regarding the ZEV sales require-
ment, and the issue concerning the construction of ZEV S.246 
1. The ZEV Sales Requirement 
The first issue concerns the ZEV sales requirement, which begins 
in 1998.247 Section 177 of the Clean Air Act declares that a state which 
adopts California vehicle emission standards shall not "prohibit or 
limit, directly or indirectly, the manufacture or sale of a new motor 
245 See Muskie, supra note 31, at 14-15; A Clean Air Act Primer: Part I, supra note 13, at 
10,161. 
246 See Complaint, supra note 5, at 23-25; see also AAMA I, supra note 3, at *1-2; MVMA I, 
supra note 10, at 1345--47. 
247 See Complaint, supra note 5, at 23. 
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vehicle or motor vehicle engine that is certified in California as meet-
ing California standards."248 
The auto-manufacturers argue that the adoption of the ZEV sales 
mandate violates section 177 of the Clean Air Act.249 As stated above, 
Massachusetts has adopted the California ZEV sales mandates.25o By 
the year 1998 two percent of all vehicles sold in Massachusetts must 
be ZEVS.251 This percentage increases in the year 2001 and once again 
in 2003.252 The ZEV sales mandate requires that each manufacturer 
meet the ZEV percentage sales quota.253 Hence, this quota system 
indirectly restricts the sale of California non-ZEV vehicles in violation 
of section 177.254 
For example, in the year 1998, the ZEV sales mandate requires that 
two percent of all vehicles sold in Massachusetts be ZEVS.255 Due to 
this requirement, manufacturers could only sell forty-nine conven-
tional California vehicles for every ZEV they sell or ZEV credit they 
purchase.256 In model year 2003, the requirement would reduce con-
ventional sales to nine out of every ten vehicles.257 Hence, the auto-
manufacturers claim, it is clear that the sales mandate limits the sale 
of conventional California vehicles in violation of section 177.258 
In addition, the auto-manufacturers argue that the lack of market 
demand in Massachusetts will limit the sale of ZEV s, and thereby 
indirectly restrict the sale of conventional California vehicles.259 The 
lack of sales incentives, coupled with ~he less favorable climate in 
Massachusetts for ZEVS,260 will result in an inadequate demand for 
the ZEVS.261 Thus, manufacturers will have to do one of two things in 
order to meet the ZEV sales quotas.262 Either they will have to reduce 
248 See 42 u.s.C. § 7507 (Supp. IV 1992). 
249 See Complaint, supra note 5, at 23. 
250 ld. at 15-16. 
251 ld. 
252 ld. 
253 Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 78, at 37-39. 
254 ld. 
255 Complaint, supra note 5, at 23. 
256 See Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 78, at 37. 
257 See id. 
258 See id. at 37-39. 
259 See id. at 38-39. 
260 The colder Massachusetts climate will negatively impact the functioning of the lead-acid 
batteries upon which the ZEVs operate, thus greatly reducing the already limited distances 
which ZEVs can travel without recharging the batteries. See Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra 
note 78, at 42. 
261 Cf id. at 38-39. 
262 See id. at 38. 
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the availability of the conventional California vehicles, thereby forc-
ing buyers to purchase ZEVs; or, they will have to increase the cost 
of the conventional California vehicles, thereby making ZEV s more 
financially attractive.263 Either option has the effect of restricting 
the sale of conventional California certified vehicles in violation of 
section 177.264 
On the other hand, the DEP can argue that section 177 prohibits 
limitations on the sale of California vehicles generally, and does not 
refer to specific classes of California vehicles.265 Hence, no state that 
adopts the California emission standards can restrict the sale of Cali-
fornia vehicles in general. 266 The ZEV sales mandate does not limit 
the sale of California vehicles generally.267 In effect, the sales mandate 
requires the sale of all categories of California vehicles, including 
ZEV S.268 Hence, the ZEV sales mandate does not violate the section 
177 prohibition. 
In so arguing, the parties have once again deconstructed the Clean 
Air Act. They have focused upon a few sentences in the Act, and have 
built their arguments around those sentences. As a result, they have 
mired what is a simple passage to understand. 
ZEVs are zero-emission vehicles which emit little or no air pollut-
ants.269 As such, they are a superior way to reduce mobile source 
pollutants and thereby fulfill the primary goal of the Clean Air Act, 
which is to protect the public health. Thus, the ZEV sales mandate 
was included in the LEV program by California in order to facilitate 
the sale of ZEV s. It is clear that any ZEV sold in Massachusetts will 
be a California-certified vehicle. It is also clear that the auto-manu-
facturers can sell any number of non-ZEV, California-certified vehi-
cles so long as they sell the specified percentages of ZEV s. Hence, 
Massachusetts has not limited the number of non-ZEV s that the 
auto-manufacturers can sell. They can sell as many conventional ve-
hicles as possible, as long as they sell the specified percentages of 
ZEVs. 
It is true that the reduced market for ZEVs in Massachusetts may 
affect the sale of non-ZEV vehicles to some degree. However, in light 
of the goals of the Clean Air Act, it would be inappropriate for the 
263 See id. 
264 See id. 
265 See MVMA II, supra note 10, at 65. 
266 See id. 
267 See id. 
268 See id. 
269 It remains to be seen the extent to which such devices as fuel-fired heaters on the ZEVs 
will emit air pollution. 
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court to interpret the "affect" as placing a "limit" on the sale of 
California vehicles. The ZEVrequirement will result in the reduction 
of mobile source pollution, hence the protection of public health. In 
addition, Congress wanted to allow the states the freedom to opt into 
the California program.270 A ruling that the ZEV sales requirement 
causes Massachusetts to violate the Clean Air Act would effectively 
prohibit Massachusetts or any other state from opting into the Cali-
fornia program. Thus, such a ruling is absurd, being both self-contra-
dictory and debasing the primary goals of the Act. 
2. The Construction of ZEV s 
The second ZEV issue concerns the construction ofthe ZEVS.271 As 
stated above, section 177 says that no state can take any action which 
has the effect of causing the automobile manufacturers to produce a 
third vehicle other than the vehicles which they produce to meet the 
federal emission standards and the California emission standards.272 
This requirement was enacted to prevent the automobile manufac-
turers from being unduly burdened.273 This issue revolves around 
whether the Massachusetts's ZEV sales mandate will require the 
construction of a third vehicle.274 
The auto-manufacturers argue that the ZEV sales quota adopted 
by Massachusetts will cause them to have to produce a ZEV different 
from the one they produce in California in order to account for the 
unique weather conditions in Massachusetts.275 Technologicallimita-
tions have resulted in the construction of ZEVs without passenger 
compartment heating systems.276 Due to the winter weather condi-
tions in Massachusetts, the automobile manufacturers would be re-
quired to modify the design of the ZEV s to include a fuel-fired heater, 
which would significantly modify the design of the California ZEV.277 
Hence, the automobile manufacturers would be required to construct 
a third vehicle for Massachusetts.278 
270 See 42 U.S.C. § 7507 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). 
271 See Complaint, supra note 5, at 24-25. 
272 See 42 U.S.C. § 7507 (Supp IV 1992). 
273 See MVMA I, supra note 10, at 1338. 
274 See Complaint, supra note 5, at 24-25. 
275 See Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 78, at 39-43; Complaint, supra note 5, at 24-25. 
276 See Plaintiff's Memo, supra note 78, at 41; see also MVMA I, supra note 10, at 1346--47. 
This does not create a problem in most urban areas of California where winter weather con-
ditions rarely reach the freezing level. See Plaintiffs Memorandum, supra note 78, at 41. 
277 See Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 78, at 41-42. 
278 See id. 
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In addition, the battery system upon which the California ZEV s 
operate would have to be redesigned.279 The performance of the lead-
acid batteries upon which the ZEVs operate is significantly affected 
by cold temperatures.280 Hence, the automobile manufacturers would 
have to redesign the battery system to include a battery heater and 
extra battery insulation for the Massachusetts ZEVS.281 These sig-
nificant alterations would result in the construction of a third vehi-
cle.282 
On the other hand, the DEP can argue that when Congress adopted 
the third vehicle prohibition, it did not intend to prevent any and 
every design change that might have to take place.283 What Congress 
was referring to were design changes in relation to the emissions 
standards.284 All ZEVs are identical with respect to the emissions 
standards.285 Changes that have to be made as a result of temperature 
differences are irrelevant to the statute. 
The analysis of this third vehicle argument is similar to the one 
stated above. The issue is whether the addition of a fuel-fired heater 
and the redesign of a battery system constitute the creation of a de 
facto third vehicle. Using the same analysis as above, it is apparent 
that such additions to the ZEVs do not constitute a third vehicle. 
First, the additions will facilitate the sale of the ZEV s, which will 
benefit not only the state, but the auto-manufacturers also. Such 
additions are also in accord with the technology forcing goals of the 
Act. Second, Massachusetts is left with the freedom to utilize ZEV s 
in its pursuit of compliance with the Clean Air Act. Finally, and most 
importantly, by concluding that the additions do not constitute a third 
vehicle, the courts are in accord with the chief goal of the Act which 
is to protect public health.286 
D. The Waiver Issue 
The auto-manufacturers have also challenged when a state can 
adopt the California emission standards.287 The auto-manufacturers 
279 See id. 
200 See id. 
281 Id. 
282 See id. 
282 See MVMA I, supra note 10, at 134~7. 
28i See id. 
285 Id. 
286 The reader is referred to the discussion of the third-vehicle problem, in section IVB above, 
for a fuller clarification of the analysis. 
287 See Complaint, supra note 5, at 21-22; see also Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 2, 
at 28...,34. 
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argue that a state may not adopt any California standards for which 
a waiver from the EPA has not been received. They point out that 
section 177 of the Clean Air Act declares that a state may adopt those 
standards relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles 
if those standards "are identical to the California standards for which 
a waiver has been granted."288 Massachusetts adopted California's 
LEV standards in January, 1992.289 California applied for an EPA 
waiver of its standards in October, 1991, but it did not receive the 
waiver until January, 1993.200 Therefore, Massachusetts adopted the 
California LEV program a full year before California had received 
its EPA waiver.291 Thus, the auto-manufacturers contend, Massachu-
setts's premature adoption violates section 177 and is therefore un-
lawful.292 
The DEP argues that section 177 does not preclude states from 
adopting the California standards prior to the EPA issuing a waiver. 293 
Section 177 says that states that are not in compliance with the ozone 
NAAQS may "adopt and enforce" the California standards if two 
conditions are met.294 First, the standards have to be identical to the 
California standards for which a waiver has been granted.295 Second, 
the standards have to be adopted at least two years prior to the 
commencement of the model year.296 
"Adoption and enforcement" comprise the "collective act" of imple-
menting the California LEV program.297 Adoption informs the auto-
mobile manufacturers that the state has opted to participate in the 
California program.298 It has a notification purpose.299 Enforcement is 
the act that requires the automobile manufacturers to conform to the 
adopted regulations.30o It establishes the effective date by which they 
must comply.30l The waiver approval requirement must be satisfied 
prior to "adoption and enforcement" as a collective unit; hence, it must 
288 See 42 u.S.C. § 7507 (1988). 
289 Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 2, at 13; see Complaint, supra note 5, at 21. 
290 Complaint, supra note 5, at 21. 
291 See id. at 21-22. 
292 [d. at 22. 
293 See Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 2, at 28-34. 
294 See id. at 29. 
295 See id.; 42 U.S.C. § 7507 (1988). 
296 See Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 2, at 29; 42 U.S.C. § 7507 (1988). 
297 See Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 2, at 29-31. 
298 See id. 
299 See id. 
300 See id. 
301 See id. 
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be satisfied prior to enforcement which completes the adoption and 
enforcement action, and not prior to adoption alone.3OO 
The goal of the Clean Air Act is to promote cleaner air thereby 
protecting the public health. In addition, Congress also desires to 
balance the rights of the states with regard to freedom to regulate air 
pollution against protection of the auto-manufacturers. In light of 
the above stated goals, we must determine whether Massachusetts's 
adoption of the California LEV program a full year ahead of Califor-
nia's receipt of a waiver for the program violated the Clean Air Act. 
In order to solve this issue, we must determine what the waiver is 
a precondition to. Once again, both parties deconstruct the Clean Air 
Act by focusing solely upon the individual words themselves. The 
auto-manufacturers say the waiver is a precondition to adoption. The 
DEP states that Massachusetts can adopt the California program 
prior to the waiver, and that the waiver is a precondition to enforce-
ment of the previously adopted program. 
If we examine the Act in light of the above stated policy goals, it is 
clear that the waiver is a precondition to enforcement. If the waiver 
is a precondition to adoption, this merely results in a delay in time for 
the opt-in states. Congress has decided to permit California to blaze 
a trail in air pollution regulation; hence, its waiver applications are 
almost always approved with minimal oversight by the federal gov-
ernment.303 The opt-in states merely have to wait until the waiver is 
approved. With regard to Massachusetts, if its adoption was found to 
be illegal, it would merely have to re-adopt the California program. 
Once again, this merely results in a delay in time. 
If the waiver is a precondition to enforcement, Massachusetts will 
be allowed to maintain its adoption of the California program. Hence, 
its enforcement of the program will not be delayed. Such an interpre-
tation allows the state to implement the new emission standards, 
resulting in cleaner air at an earlier point in time. Hence, the public 
health will be better protected by this interpretation. In addition, this 
interpretation allows the state the freedom it needs to best control 
air pollution; and the auto-industry is no worse off with the exception 
of a time element which they must now abide by. Hence, the interpre-
tation most in line with the Clean Air Act states that the waiver is a 
precondition to enforcement. 
302 See id. 
303 See Ford Motor Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 606 F.2d 1293, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 
1979). 
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v. CONCLUSION 
The primary goal of the Clean Air Act is to improve air quality, and 
thereby protect the public health. In advancing this goal, Congress 
also desires to balance two competing goals. Congress wants to pro-
tect the states' freedom to control air pollution in any manner they 
deem necessary. Each state knows what is needed to best improve 
the air quality in that state. In addition, each state knows how to best 
balance the competing concerns of air quality and tax burdens. Hence, 
Congress seeks to allow the states to control their own pollution 
problems. However, the states' freedom must be balanced against the 
competing concern of protection for the automobile industry. If each 
state is allowed to control mobile source pollution without regard to 
the auto-industry, the auto-manufacturers could potentially end up 
creating fifty -one different types of vehicles to satisfy each state's and 
the federal government's pollution control programs. Thus, in improv-
ing air quality and protecting public health, these two competing 
concerns must be balanced against one another. 
When interpreting the Clean Air Act, each of the above factors 
must be considered. The framers of the Act developed the terminol-
ogy of the Act in light of these factors. Hence, these factors form the 
story of each term in the Act. As Oliver Wendell Holmes stated, "If 
my fellow citizens want to go to Hell, I will help them. It's my job." 
It is the job of every person interpreting the Clean Air Act to inter-
pret it in light of its legislative goals; that is, in light of its story. 
